Characterizing future international systems
As discussed in a previous post, scenario building is a practice that has value in suggesting possible alternate futures for the purposes of planning and resource allocation in the present. Often this practice is devoted to specific policy problems, but it can also be devoted to the continuing evolution of the entire international system or even of IR theory itself. The purpose of this posting is to discuss in broad terms the IR variables that will be important for state leaders and policy-makers to consider and their likely evolution in the near future.
IR theory directs itself at describing, explaining and predicting state behavior. Most of its analysis is spent on history, but future international systems can be outlined in broad terms based on IR theories' own broader variables. Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University is renowned for his broad strokes of paradigmatic theory, two of which will be used in this exercise.
The trend of democratization is a broad trend that is found in the world's political history. Huntington describes these trends as "waves" that are also subject to reversal. The US, UK and Europe states were part of a long first wave, the second wave was primarily in Latin America and several Caribbean islands, and the third wave occurred in Central America and some African nations. Huntington's book "The Third Wave" was written at the end of this third wave, and the current democratization of Indonesia could be considered the extension of the third wave or the beginnings of a fourth wave that may eventually include China and the Middle East. Therefore, the success of the third wave and the beginning of a fourth wave of democratization will be the first possible component of future international systems, while the reversal of the third wave and the decay of modern democracy is its complimentary alternate value.
More recently in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington suggests that culture is quickly becoming the dividing line that will separate allies and enemies in the future, replacing the ideological dichotomy that fueled the Cold War. With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Huntington's paradigm quickly replaced Francis Fukuyama's End of History paradigm that suggested the ultimate ideological and political victory of Western culture. Ethnic identity had previously been explored by political scientists under the term "nationalism," as small ethnic groups began demanding their own autonomy and statehood in the 1990's (for example, Chechnya or the many fragments that emerged from the former Yugoslavia) Although Huntington's characterization of future international order has been challenged and hotly debated (as most Huntington hypotheses are), much value has been assigned to this portrayal of future international systems, if only due to the strength it draws from its simplicity and face validity. Therefore, the increase or decrease of ethnic "nationalism" or identification among states will be the second independent variable of this scenario building exercise.
These two independent variables are particularly appropriate based on the current US foreign policy goals to spread democracy and liberal economic models abroad. Both of these goals are in attunement with the "waves of democracy" historical trend, and its primary obstacle may very well be the resistant political culture found in "Asian values" and the Islamic Resurgence described in Huntington's Clash of Civilizations.
Placing these two primary independent variables on continua, four futures can be produced and described. Within these four worlds, trends of international relations and state behavior can be discussed to suggest the future environment within which state actors will be acting. This exercise can be of use to US policy planners to prepare for what likely challenges they will face and to identify issues that they should give attention and devote resources towards now in the present.
In order to fully develop each world into a dynamic model, Richard Rosecrance's systems model presented in his book Action and Reaction in World Politics will be used to characterize each outcome. Both Rosecrance and Robert Gilpin have produced dynamic models to describe and forecast the evolution of international systems, but Rosecrance's incorporates a greater number of domestic variables into his model. Because the two independent variables of this scenario building exercise concern themselves so much with domestic variables, Rosecrance's model is a more appropriate choice of model here. Gilpin's model would at least suggest that American hegemony is nearing an end as Chinese size and economic momentum raise it to international predominance. Within each model, critical issues such as WMD proliferation, natural resource access, openness to trade, AIDS and environmental policies, and the use of international institutions will be discussed.
In a world where democracy has spread successfully but ethnic identity increases in importance, Huntington's "democratic paradox" is realized. Politically empowered and ethnically-attentive populations in China and the Middle East are likely to challenge the current international order in a revisionist direction. International institutions are likely to be replaced by federal ethnic alliances, which will share resources (both economic and military) amongst themselves but will exclude any ethnic "others." The US and Europe will likely seek to maintain their advantageous positions, but the Asian Affirmation and Islamic Resurgence, invigorated and empowered by democracy and economic liberalism will reorder the international system drastically.
In a world where democracy has suffered a reversal and ethnic identity increases in importance, an even fuller "Clash of Civilizations" results, where a revisionist and rising China is likely to reorder the international system. A balance of power mechanism, acting as a system regulator, might be able to contain system disturbances felt in the US, Europe, and the Middle East, but Chinese demand for natural resources and economic assets amidst increasing scarcity are likely to produce a radical system transformation.
In a world where democracy has suffered a reversal and ethnic identity decreases in importance, cross-ethnic alliances may preserve the system's balance, but China's continued revisionist position may still be too much for the system to bear. As democratic decay sets in, state elites in the US, Europe, and the Middle East may be able to preserve the status quo through collaboration, but with a tripolar distribution of power based on military strength, economic capabilities, and control of natural resources between the US, the Middle East, and China, state loyalties will be difficult to predict. This obstacle of unpredictability itself implies a system instability as China may choose to join the US in its domination of Middle East state governments to fully exploit its resources, or it may align with Middle East leaders to destroy American hegemony.
In a world where democracy has spread successfully and ethnic identity decreases in importance, Fukuyama's "End of History" again appears to become feasible. A universal culture acts as a system regulator and reinvigorates international institutions like the UN. State leaders are much more likely to be cooperative while at the same time their power is checked by democratic institutions and dense webs of economic interactions between their nations. Controlling WMD proliferation and addressing the global problems of the environment and AIDS also become possible in this future.
China's role is an obvious common issue amongst these possible worlds, and only its democratization permits greater openness and cooperation in any future international system. Upcoming scarcities following the "oil peak" that has reportedly been reached during this decade will make cooperation and non-zero sum approaches in state behavior much more difficult, and a China that remains directed by authoritarian elites or by its own population but invigorated by ethnic identity will play similar and aggressive roles as it becomes the predominant world power. This power is by nature of its size, resources, and status as a nuclear power, and its economic momentum may only be derailed by its acceptance of a more accommodating and pacific political culture (though the assumption that democratic societies are indeed more pacific is a tenuous one at best).
China is assumed to be secure in each scenario, which may also be contested. It is the degree of control and legitimacy of its elites that will vary as democratization or ethnic identity prevail in influencing its billions of citizens. In addition, several other nations are not addressed in these models, such as Russia and the 'Stans, as well as the nuclear-equipped and democratic state of India. Additional variables such as technological innovation and leadership might also alter the reality of natural resource scarcities and political approaches in dealing with them.
What this means is that China is where the most policy attention should be paid no win the present. The people of China in particular matter the most, and the promotion of a universal and open political culture over divisive ethnic identity should be a policy priority for the US. If China is in fact less secure than assumed in these models, China's threat to US hegemony could be derailed preemptively, though the possibility of another nuclear superpower fragmented and fostering greater systemic instability and unpredictability might be considered an even more troubling future to some.
IR theory directs itself at describing, explaining and predicting state behavior. Most of its analysis is spent on history, but future international systems can be outlined in broad terms based on IR theories' own broader variables. Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University is renowned for his broad strokes of paradigmatic theory, two of which will be used in this exercise.
The trend of democratization is a broad trend that is found in the world's political history. Huntington describes these trends as "waves" that are also subject to reversal. The US, UK and Europe states were part of a long first wave, the second wave was primarily in Latin America and several Caribbean islands, and the third wave occurred in Central America and some African nations. Huntington's book "The Third Wave" was written at the end of this third wave, and the current democratization of Indonesia could be considered the extension of the third wave or the beginnings of a fourth wave that may eventually include China and the Middle East. Therefore, the success of the third wave and the beginning of a fourth wave of democratization will be the first possible component of future international systems, while the reversal of the third wave and the decay of modern democracy is its complimentary alternate value.
More recently in his book, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Huntington suggests that culture is quickly becoming the dividing line that will separate allies and enemies in the future, replacing the ideological dichotomy that fueled the Cold War. With the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Huntington's paradigm quickly replaced Francis Fukuyama's End of History paradigm that suggested the ultimate ideological and political victory of Western culture. Ethnic identity had previously been explored by political scientists under the term "nationalism," as small ethnic groups began demanding their own autonomy and statehood in the 1990's (for example, Chechnya or the many fragments that emerged from the former Yugoslavia) Although Huntington's characterization of future international order has been challenged and hotly debated (as most Huntington hypotheses are), much value has been assigned to this portrayal of future international systems, if only due to the strength it draws from its simplicity and face validity. Therefore, the increase or decrease of ethnic "nationalism" or identification among states will be the second independent variable of this scenario building exercise.
These two independent variables are particularly appropriate based on the current US foreign policy goals to spread democracy and liberal economic models abroad. Both of these goals are in attunement with the "waves of democracy" historical trend, and its primary obstacle may very well be the resistant political culture found in "Asian values" and the Islamic Resurgence described in Huntington's Clash of Civilizations.
Placing these two primary independent variables on continua, four futures can be produced and described. Within these four worlds, trends of international relations and state behavior can be discussed to suggest the future environment within which state actors will be acting. This exercise can be of use to US policy planners to prepare for what likely challenges they will face and to identify issues that they should give attention and devote resources towards now in the present.
In order to fully develop each world into a dynamic model, Richard Rosecrance's systems model presented in his book Action and Reaction in World Politics will be used to characterize each outcome. Both Rosecrance and Robert Gilpin have produced dynamic models to describe and forecast the evolution of international systems, but Rosecrance's incorporates a greater number of domestic variables into his model. Because the two independent variables of this scenario building exercise concern themselves so much with domestic variables, Rosecrance's model is a more appropriate choice of model here. Gilpin's model would at least suggest that American hegemony is nearing an end as Chinese size and economic momentum raise it to international predominance. Within each model, critical issues such as WMD proliferation, natural resource access, openness to trade, AIDS and environmental policies, and the use of international institutions will be discussed.
In a world where democracy has spread successfully but ethnic identity increases in importance, Huntington's "democratic paradox" is realized. Politically empowered and ethnically-attentive populations in China and the Middle East are likely to challenge the current international order in a revisionist direction. International institutions are likely to be replaced by federal ethnic alliances, which will share resources (both economic and military) amongst themselves but will exclude any ethnic "others." The US and Europe will likely seek to maintain their advantageous positions, but the Asian Affirmation and Islamic Resurgence, invigorated and empowered by democracy and economic liberalism will reorder the international system drastically.
In a world where democracy has suffered a reversal and ethnic identity increases in importance, an even fuller "Clash of Civilizations" results, where a revisionist and rising China is likely to reorder the international system. A balance of power mechanism, acting as a system regulator, might be able to contain system disturbances felt in the US, Europe, and the Middle East, but Chinese demand for natural resources and economic assets amidst increasing scarcity are likely to produce a radical system transformation.
In a world where democracy has suffered a reversal and ethnic identity decreases in importance, cross-ethnic alliances may preserve the system's balance, but China's continued revisionist position may still be too much for the system to bear. As democratic decay sets in, state elites in the US, Europe, and the Middle East may be able to preserve the status quo through collaboration, but with a tripolar distribution of power based on military strength, economic capabilities, and control of natural resources between the US, the Middle East, and China, state loyalties will be difficult to predict. This obstacle of unpredictability itself implies a system instability as China may choose to join the US in its domination of Middle East state governments to fully exploit its resources, or it may align with Middle East leaders to destroy American hegemony.
In a world where democracy has spread successfully and ethnic identity decreases in importance, Fukuyama's "End of History" again appears to become feasible. A universal culture acts as a system regulator and reinvigorates international institutions like the UN. State leaders are much more likely to be cooperative while at the same time their power is checked by democratic institutions and dense webs of economic interactions between their nations. Controlling WMD proliferation and addressing the global problems of the environment and AIDS also become possible in this future.
China's role is an obvious common issue amongst these possible worlds, and only its democratization permits greater openness and cooperation in any future international system. Upcoming scarcities following the "oil peak" that has reportedly been reached during this decade will make cooperation and non-zero sum approaches in state behavior much more difficult, and a China that remains directed by authoritarian elites or by its own population but invigorated by ethnic identity will play similar and aggressive roles as it becomes the predominant world power. This power is by nature of its size, resources, and status as a nuclear power, and its economic momentum may only be derailed by its acceptance of a more accommodating and pacific political culture (though the assumption that democratic societies are indeed more pacific is a tenuous one at best).
China is assumed to be secure in each scenario, which may also be contested. It is the degree of control and legitimacy of its elites that will vary as democratization or ethnic identity prevail in influencing its billions of citizens. In addition, several other nations are not addressed in these models, such as Russia and the 'Stans, as well as the nuclear-equipped and democratic state of India. Additional variables such as technological innovation and leadership might also alter the reality of natural resource scarcities and political approaches in dealing with them.
What this means is that China is where the most policy attention should be paid no win the present. The people of China in particular matter the most, and the promotion of a universal and open political culture over divisive ethnic identity should be a policy priority for the US. If China is in fact less secure than assumed in these models, China's threat to US hegemony could be derailed preemptively, though the possibility of another nuclear superpower fragmented and fostering greater systemic instability and unpredictability might be considered an even more troubling future to some.
posted by machiavelli at 2:00 PM
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