Constructivism defined
I must admit that the "unusual analogy" that I used in the previous post to discuss the development of state interests and environments that foster cooperation actually originated as an analogy to explain aspects of the theory of constructivism.
Constructivism is an identity and perception-based explanation of state interests that resembles (at least to me) aspects of post-modern philosophy. The analogy of a child maturing into a parent is used within the context of constructivism to describe the evolution of perspectives from "me-ness" to we-ness."
Constructivism uses immaterial bases to explain how national interests in fact follow from national identity and how state behavior reflects intersubjective perceptions about the world and "other"s.
These interests and identities are no longer rationally derived, rather how a state behaves and what its interests are depend on how it perceives itself, how it perceives the world, and how it perceives others. As such, constructivists argue that international cooperation is derived from the presence of collective interests, which in turn are derived from the development of collective identity.
Collective identity is the progression from an "I" to a "we" (a perspective that, note, also presupposes the existence of an "other"). Returning to the previously used analogy, it is the development of a wholly egoistic child or teenager into an adolescent with initial relationships that include some collective action/cooperation; then into a married individual who retains some portions of their individuality; and finally into a family with children where individuals have now been melded together into a single unit.
States that have achieved this kind of collective identity share common interests and have common goals. Among states with this communal bond, the problems of collective action that impede cooperation evaporate.
Constructivist theory suggests three paths by which collective identity can be formed. Through the path of "structural context," state interactions within international institutions create shared social practices, shared expectations, and shared understandings. A collective identity ossifies from this context in a manner that one might characterize as through a 'team-building' exercise. Within "systemic process," system-level progress (note that a future post on systems theory will make this path a bit more understandable) is made from interdependence to a convergence of norms either through a dense network of interactions that foster common interests and goals or through the emergence of a common "other" that fosters a common aversion. Finally, according to "strategic practice," states realize their initial joint interests and problems and see collective action as a viable way to alleviate them. Over time, this strategic choice changes their disparate identities into a collective one.
The primary criticism of constructivism is that it has no basis in empirical evidence. By relying on intersubjective perceptions to explain why states behave as they do, this theory can never be tested or proved wrong/right. As a further weakness, it is quite difficult to see how this approach can ever produce future predictions as opposed to merely the description of past state actions. As such, this IR theory is unlikely to have the sort of respect and longevity that the neorealist and neoliberal traditions have achieved.
Constructivism is an identity and perception-based explanation of state interests that resembles (at least to me) aspects of post-modern philosophy. The analogy of a child maturing into a parent is used within the context of constructivism to describe the evolution of perspectives from "me-ness" to we-ness."
Constructivism uses immaterial bases to explain how national interests in fact follow from national identity and how state behavior reflects intersubjective perceptions about the world and "other"s.
These interests and identities are no longer rationally derived, rather how a state behaves and what its interests are depend on how it perceives itself, how it perceives the world, and how it perceives others. As such, constructivists argue that international cooperation is derived from the presence of collective interests, which in turn are derived from the development of collective identity.
Collective identity is the progression from an "I" to a "we" (a perspective that, note, also presupposes the existence of an "other"). Returning to the previously used analogy, it is the development of a wholly egoistic child or teenager into an adolescent with initial relationships that include some collective action/cooperation; then into a married individual who retains some portions of their individuality; and finally into a family with children where individuals have now been melded together into a single unit.
States that have achieved this kind of collective identity share common interests and have common goals. Among states with this communal bond, the problems of collective action that impede cooperation evaporate.
Constructivist theory suggests three paths by which collective identity can be formed. Through the path of "structural context," state interactions within international institutions create shared social practices, shared expectations, and shared understandings. A collective identity ossifies from this context in a manner that one might characterize as through a 'team-building' exercise. Within "systemic process," system-level progress (note that a future post on systems theory will make this path a bit more understandable) is made from interdependence to a convergence of norms either through a dense network of interactions that foster common interests and goals or through the emergence of a common "other" that fosters a common aversion. Finally, according to "strategic practice," states realize their initial joint interests and problems and see collective action as a viable way to alleviate them. Over time, this strategic choice changes their disparate identities into a collective one.
The primary criticism of constructivism is that it has no basis in empirical evidence. By relying on intersubjective perceptions to explain why states behave as they do, this theory can never be tested or proved wrong/right. As a further weakness, it is quite difficult to see how this approach can ever produce future predictions as opposed to merely the description of past state actions. As such, this IR theory is unlikely to have the sort of respect and longevity that the neorealist and neoliberal traditions have achieved.
posted by machiavelli at 8:30 AM
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