Hegemonic stability theory
This post will discuss two prominent IR theorists' models for the concept of hegemonic stability.
Duncan Snidal and Robert Gilpin see system hegemons as the only actors capable of providing system stability and collective security in the midst of the anarchic, self-help environment of the international system. System stability and collective security are "public goods" in that they are shared jointly and nonexclusively, and free-riding can occur when states enjoy them without contributing any of their own resources in providing them.
Both Snidal and Gilpin agree that hegemons bear a disproportionate cost in the provision of system stability and collective security. Because a hegemon has an obvious interest in maintaining the status quo, it will be willing to expend resources to do so even if other states in the system free-ride on these public goods. However, this arrangement will eventually lead to the decline and inevitable fall of the hegemon.
Snidal argues that the loss of a hegemon does not necessarily mean the end of stability and security in the international system. Initially, a hegemon is able to bear the cost of providing public goods because it receives a net benefit. As a hegemon declines, its net benefit diminishes and its capability to contribute to public goods is also reduced. The point at which there is no longer a net benefit for the hegemon should be where system stability collapses.
However, Snidal suggests that free-riding states will prefer to cease their free-riding behavior and begin contributing to the provision of the public goods, bearing some of their costs. Faced with a choice, these states will accept a reduced net benefit rather than lose it completely.
Gilpin's model for the role of the hegemon in the international system is developed in his book, War and Change in World Politics. Gilpin sees in history an apparent pattern of episodic hegemonic war, and he models a transformation process from the equilibrium of hegemonic stability to disequilibrium and then back again.
In between the system-transforming conflicts of hegemonic war, peace and stability are provided by the hegemon. Gilpin rejects the arguments of regime theorists such as Robert Keohane who suggest that regimes can manage stability and security in the international system 'after hegemony.' Once a hegemon has lost its position of advantage over all other states, war results.
During Gilpin's equilibrium of hegemonic stability, other states make relative gains until power and state capabilities have been redistributed to the extent that either negotiation or war must occur. When a state sees that the benefits of changing the system outweigh the costs of initiating such a change, war breaks out and continues so long as its marginal benefit continues to outweigh its marginal cost. After the systemic resolution of hegemonic war, a new equilibrium is created.
These models do an excellent job of explaining how and why periods of hegemonic stability arise and yet are so short-lived. A hegemon might be able to 'rig the rules' of the system so that it receives a disproportionate benefit from the public goods that it provides, extending its advantage and entrenching its position; However, no state has ever been able to maintain a position of system dominance forever. At the same time, Snidal's suggestion that cooperation becomes more likely amidst a declining hegemon makes Gilpin's model seem the more realistic of the two. Snidal has an apparent bias towards stability, while Gilpin's preference for stability is only mildly normative and does not reduce the dynamic nature and explanatory power of his model.
Duncan Snidal and Robert Gilpin see system hegemons as the only actors capable of providing system stability and collective security in the midst of the anarchic, self-help environment of the international system. System stability and collective security are "public goods" in that they are shared jointly and nonexclusively, and free-riding can occur when states enjoy them without contributing any of their own resources in providing them.
Both Snidal and Gilpin agree that hegemons bear a disproportionate cost in the provision of system stability and collective security. Because a hegemon has an obvious interest in maintaining the status quo, it will be willing to expend resources to do so even if other states in the system free-ride on these public goods. However, this arrangement will eventually lead to the decline and inevitable fall of the hegemon.
Snidal argues that the loss of a hegemon does not necessarily mean the end of stability and security in the international system. Initially, a hegemon is able to bear the cost of providing public goods because it receives a net benefit. As a hegemon declines, its net benefit diminishes and its capability to contribute to public goods is also reduced. The point at which there is no longer a net benefit for the hegemon should be where system stability collapses.
However, Snidal suggests that free-riding states will prefer to cease their free-riding behavior and begin contributing to the provision of the public goods, bearing some of their costs. Faced with a choice, these states will accept a reduced net benefit rather than lose it completely.
Gilpin's model for the role of the hegemon in the international system is developed in his book, War and Change in World Politics. Gilpin sees in history an apparent pattern of episodic hegemonic war, and he models a transformation process from the equilibrium of hegemonic stability to disequilibrium and then back again.
In between the system-transforming conflicts of hegemonic war, peace and stability are provided by the hegemon. Gilpin rejects the arguments of regime theorists such as Robert Keohane who suggest that regimes can manage stability and security in the international system 'after hegemony.' Once a hegemon has lost its position of advantage over all other states, war results.
During Gilpin's equilibrium of hegemonic stability, other states make relative gains until power and state capabilities have been redistributed to the extent that either negotiation or war must occur. When a state sees that the benefits of changing the system outweigh the costs of initiating such a change, war breaks out and continues so long as its marginal benefit continues to outweigh its marginal cost. After the systemic resolution of hegemonic war, a new equilibrium is created.
These models do an excellent job of explaining how and why periods of hegemonic stability arise and yet are so short-lived. A hegemon might be able to 'rig the rules' of the system so that it receives a disproportionate benefit from the public goods that it provides, extending its advantage and entrenching its position; However, no state has ever been able to maintain a position of system dominance forever. At the same time, Snidal's suggestion that cooperation becomes more likely amidst a declining hegemon makes Gilpin's model seem the more realistic of the two. Snidal has an apparent bias towards stability, while Gilpin's preference for stability is only mildly normative and does not reduce the dynamic nature and explanatory power of his model.
posted by machiavelli at 10:00 AM
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